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FAILURE CASE STUDIES AND ETHICS IN ENGINEERING  
MECHANICS COURSES  
By Norbert J. Delatte Jr.; Member, ASCE  
ABSTRACT: Often, engineering students do not study engineering failures or discuss ethics until they take 
upper division undergraduate courses or graduate level courses. One drawback to this approach is that problems 
analyzed in introductory courses are often contrived, uninteresting, and bear little relation to the problems 
encountered in engineering practice. At the point when educators need to grab the student's interest in engi-
neering most, they should show the excitement and relevance of the profession. Another is that the students 
encounter the issues of ethics, responsibility, and accountability that are often highlighted by a failure, late in 
their engineering education. As a result, they may see these issues as secondary to engineering practice rather 
than fundamentally embedded. Examples of failure case studies and their incorporation into introductory engi-
neering mechanics courses are discussed, along with ethical implications. When possible, problems should be 
selected so that the students can perform the calculations. By incorporating this material earlier in engineering 
education, it is possible to forge a stronger link between engineering education and practice. 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of engineering failures can offer students valuable 
insights into structural behavior and the responsibilities of the 
engineering profession. Occasionally, forensic engineering 
courses are offered at the graduate level. Since it is not prac-
tical to introduce yet another course into already crowded un-
dergraduate engineering curricula, the suggestion has been 
made to incorporate failure case studies into other courses 
(Rendon-Herrero 1993). Unfortunately, engineering students 
rarely encounter failure case studies before taking upper di-
vision undergraduate or graduate level courses. Instead, in in-
troductory engineering mechanics courses, such as statics, dy-
namics, and mechanics of materials, they often study 
contrived, simple problems with limited practical application. 
This is unfortunate because the opportunity to inspire students 
with the excitement and relevance of the profession is missed. 
In many cases, the relevant principles of engineering science 
may be brought out in the study of failure case studies. The 
case studies may be used as example problems in lectures, or 
as homework problems. The problems may have to be sim-
plified so the students can perform the calculations. The issues 
of responsibility, accountability, or ethics that led to or influ-
enced the failure should also be addressed by the instructor. 
When possible, educators should bring practitioners who have 
investigated failures into the classroom as guest lecturers. 
SUGGESTED FORMAT 
A format for incorporating a failure case study into a lesson 
is suggested in the following: 
1. 	 Learning point: The case study must be tied to a specific 
course topic. Possible learning points include drawing a 
correct and complete free-body diagram, calculating for-
ces due to impacts, stress-strain relationships, the effect 
of structural deformation on performance, or buckling. 
2. 	 Narrative: The events leading to the failure should be 
summarized. The problem description may be brief but 
should include all likely causes of the failure. If the case 
study is assigned as a homework problem, references 
may be provided or recommended, or left to the student. 
Ideally, if failure case studies can be integrated into sev-
eral courses in the curriculum, a supplemental text such 
as Why Buildings Fall Down (Levy and Salvadori 1992), 
Design and Construction Failures (Kaminetzky 1991), 
or Construction Failure (Feld and Carper 1997) could be 
purchased by students and used in multiple courses. 
3. 	 Technical aspects and calculations: The problem model 
may be simplified so that the students can perform the 
calculations. The lesson will probably be more effective 
if the students can "discover" the reason for the collapse 
through their calculations. In some cases the case study 
can be presented without calculations; however, when 
possible they should be incorporated. 
4. Ethical considerations: In each case the ethical implica-
tions of the case study should be considered. Did the 
engineer or engineers concerned do all that could be rea-
sonably expected to prevent the problem? Were there any 
relevant legal findings? Judges, lawyers, juries, and other 
engineers may have different interpretations of what may 
reasonably be foreseen by a designer. What can students 
learn from these case studies that will better prepare them 
to become practitioners of the engineering profession? 
EXAMPLE CASE STUDIES 
Sample case studies for topics in statics, dynamics, and me-
chanics of materials are discussed in the following. 
Statics: Free-Body Diagram 
Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse 
Learning Point. The free-body diagram is the basic equi-
librium analysis tool to determine the forces that structures 
must support. It is the starting point for any structural analysis. 
Narrative. On July 17, 1981, a pair of walkways in the 
Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Kans., collapsed, killing 
114 people and injuring over 200. Two walkways were stacked 
on top of each other and suspended from the ceiling; the top 
walkway fell on the bottom walkway, and the two fell onto 
the floor of the crowded atrium. The relevant facts of the case 
were 
1. 	 The hanger detail for the two walkways, as originally 
designed, could not be built. The steel fabricator re-
quested a change in the detail, and the engineer of record 
approved it without checking the calculations. 
2. 	 Examination of the box beams supporting the upper 
walkway after the collapse showed that the upper hanger 
rod had pulled through the beam. The beam was made 
of two steel channels welded together (Levy and Salva-
dori 1992; Kaminetzky 1991; Rubin and Banick 1987; 
Feld and Carper 1997). The instructor may have to ex-
plain the structural behavior of these details. 
3. 	 Although many people were on the walkway when it 
collapsed, the actual load was still much less than the 
code mandated capacity for the system (Levy and Sal-
vadori 1992). 
Technical Aspects and Calculations. Provide the original 
design and as-built box beam hanger details (Fig. I). By draw-
ing free-body diagrams of the two details, it can be shown that 
the load transferred by the nut on the hanger rod to the bottom 
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FIG. 1. Hyatt Regency Hanger Details As-Built (a)z and As-De-
signed (b) (Levy and Salvadori 1992) (Reprinted by Permission) 
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FIG. 2. Free-Body Diagrams: (a) As-Designed Details; (b) As-
Built Details (Reprinted by Permission) 
FIG. 3. Pulled-Out Rod at Fourth-Floor Box Beam (Levy and 
Salvadori 1992) (Reprinted by Permission) 
of the box beam was doubled in the as-built detail (Fig. 2). 
The beam design was also unsatisfactory, and this condition 
was aggravated by the increased load on the nut. The nut 
pulled through the box beam (Fig. 3). 
Ethical Considerations. According to Rubin and Banick 
(1987), the engineers were contacted repeatedly during fabri-
cation and construction by individuals with doubts about the 
adequacy of the detail, and claimed more than once to have 
checked it. Prudent engineers will view a question about the 
safety of their design as an opportunity to review the work 
and reassure the public, rather than as an attack on their ex-
pertise. Ethical issues are thoroughly discussed in Feld and 
Carper (1997). 
T.w. Love Dam Cantilever Form Failure 
Learning Point. It is important to show all support re-
actions on a free-body diagram. If support reactions are omit-
ted, the model of structural behavior may be oversimplified or 
dangerously incorrect. 
Narrative. In 1981 concrete form work at a dam construc-
tion site failed, killing two workers and injuring 13. The form-
work was anchored into previously placed concrete, and the 
anchors were intended to be loaded in tension only (Kami-
netzky 1991). 
Technical Aspects and Calculations. Fig. 4 shows the 
form work as placed on the sloping concrete, with the assumed 
forces in the anchor bolts (shown as "she bolt"). However, 
with this structural model there is no equilibrating shear force 
in the bolts to keep the form work from sliding down the face 
of the dam (Fig. 5). This required shear force induced a bend-
ing moment in the anchor bolt. Examination of the failed an-
chor bolts indicated bending fracture (Kaminetzky 1991). 
Ethical Considerations. The form work was designed by 
a formwork vendor (Kaminetzky 1991). Formwork is often 
left to the contractor, but formwork failures can lead to sub-
stantial loss of life and property. Who should take responsi-
bility for formwork on a job site? 
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FIG. 4. T. W. Love Dam Formwork, System Not in Equilibrium 
(Kaminetzky 1991) (Reprinted by Permission) 
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FIG. 5. T. W. Love Dam Formwork Support Reactions (Re-
printed by Permission) 
Dynamics 
Mass Moment of Inertia and Stiffness: Tacoma Narrows 
Bridge Collapse 
Learning Point. The mass moment of inertia of a struc-
tural member is a measure of its resistance to twisting forces 
and accelerations. 
Narrative. Only three months after the Tacoma Narrows 
bridge opened in 1940, tie-down cables intended to stiffen the 
bridge snapped during a windstorm. The cables had been an-
chored into the ground and attached to the parts of the bridge 
deck that were moving the most. The cables were replaced. 
The bridge became notorious for large movements during high 
winds. On November 7, 1940, with a wind velocity of about 
60 k/h, the bridge began twisting and oscillating violently. The 
bridge was twisting about 45° in two waves, and oscillating 
up and down I m in nine waves. The oscillations reached 8 
m as the bridge tore itself apart (Levy and Salvadori 1992; 
Feld and Carper; 1997). The dramatic failure of the bridge is 
shown in Fig. 6. 
Technical Aspects and Calculations. The mathematics 
involved in the oscillations of a slender bridge are difficult and 
were not well understood in 1940. However, suspension 
bridges had failed in the 18th and 19th centuries. The Tacoma 
Narrows bridge was three times more flexible than the Golden 
FIG. 6. Failure of Tacoma Narrows Bridge (Feld and Carper 
1997) (Reprinted by Permission) 
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FIG. 7. Deck Cross Sections (Not to Scale): (a) Original; (b) 
Replacement 
Gate or George Washington bridges. Like the Bronx-White-
stone Bridge, it used a damper, but the damper failed almost 
immediately. The other bridges had a much greater stiffness 
and mass moment of inertia, and were less prone to wind-
induced accelerations (Levy and Salvadori 1992). The replace-
ment bridge, which is still in use, had four lanes rather than 
two and lO-m deep stiffening trusses in place of the original 
2A-m trusses (Feld and Carper 1997). The resistance to the 
vertical oscillation is proportional to the mass of the bridge, 
which is doubled in the replacement design. The resistance to 
rotational acceleration is represented by the mass moment of 
inertia I 
(1) 
where: m = mass; and r = moment arm from an axis to the 
element dm (Hibbeler 1995). 
Thus, the doubling of the mass of the deck plus the much 
greater depth of the stiffening trusses considerably increased 
the mass moment of inertia of the replacement bridge com-
pared to the original. Doubling the number of lanes alone in-
creases the mass by a factor of 2, the moment arm by a factor 
of 2, and the mass moment of inertia by a factor of 8. The 
original and replacement decks are shown in Fig. 7. 
Ethical Considerations. Should more attention have been 
paid to the causes of the tie-down cable failure? Is the occa-
sional failure of a ground-breaking structure part of the cost 
of doing business? Should we differentiate between failures 
caused by neglect (the Hyatt Regency) and failures caused by 
ignorance in pushing the state of the art? 
Kinetics: Bomber Crashes into Empire State Building 
Learning Point. There are several ways to calculate for-
ces due to impacts. Although rare, large vehicle impacts into 
buildings are possible. 
Narrative. On July 28, 1945, a lO-t (lO,ooO-kg) 8-25 
bomber crashed into the Empire State Building at an estimated 
400 k/h into the north face of the 79th floor. Although several 
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FIG. 8. B·25 Bomber Crashes into the Empire State Building 
people were killed, the building remained standing (Levy and 
Salvadori 1992). 
Technical Aspects and Calculations. To estimate the 
force applied to the building, we must estimate either the de-
celeration of the bomber as it crashed into the building (and 
use the force-acceleration method), estimate the distance it 
took the bomber to come to rest (and use work-energy), or 
estimate the time it took the bomber to come to rest (and use 
impulse-momentum). The bomber did not pass through the 
building, so a distance of 10-20 m for the plane to come to 
rest could be used for calculations. If the bomber came to rest 
in 20 m with a constant deceleration, the force would be about 
4,440 kN exerted over about 0.25 s (Fig. 8). 
All three of these methods are derived from F = rna (Hib-
beler 1995). The acceleration is assumed to be constant and is 
integrated once for velocity and twice for distance traveled. 
With an initial velocity of 400 k/h or 111.1 mIs, a final ve-
locity of zero, and an initial position of zero and a final po-
sition of 20 m, the velocity equation becomes 
v(t) =at + 111.1 (2) 
and the position equation becomes 
2at
set) =2 + 111.1t (3) 
Solving these two equations simultaneously gives a t of 
about 0.36 s and an acceleration of 308.6 m/s2 (actually a 
deceleration, which will affect the direction of the force). 
• Force acceleration: From F = ma 
F =10,000 kg X 308.6 m/s2 =3,086 kN (4) 
• Work energy: Initial kinetic energy plus work done equals 
final kinetic energy leads to 
(5) 
where TI = initial kinetic energy; U I _ 2 = work done be-
tween position 1 and position 2 (initial and final); and T2 
= final kinetic energy. Initial kinetic energy is 
(6) 
where m = mass (10,000 kg, given previously); and v = 
initial velocity of 111.1 m/s. Thus, the initial kinetic 
energy is 61,700,000 N'm 
U'_2 = F X d (7) 
where F :::: unknown force; and d = distance of 20 m. The 
final kinetic energy is zero because the final velocity is 
zero, after the bomber comes to rest. Finally, to get the 
force 
F = U t _ 2 =61,700,000 =3,086 kN (8)
d 20 
which is exactly the same result as before. 
• Impulse-momentum: The initial momentum plus the im-
pulse equals the final momentum, or 
(9) 
For a constant force, this becomes 
(10) 
Substituting previous values of 10,000 kg for ml and m2, 
111.1 mls for Vlo zero for V2, and 0.36 s for the time 
elapsed (t2 - tl ), we once more calculate 
10,000 X 111.1 
(II)0.36 = 3,086 kN 
This problem is useful for demonstrating the equivalence 
of the three methods. 
Ethical Considerations. A bomber crashing into a build-
ing is an extremely unlikely occurrence. However, the conse-
quences of the collapse of a large building are very grave. 
How should the profession guard against rare, but severe ev-
ents? In a large and complicated project, is there an obligation 
to go beyond building code requirements? For example, for 
nuclear reactor containment vessels, what extreme events 
should engineers consider? What about buildings subject to 
terrorist attacks? 
Mechanics of Materials 
Stress and Strain: Shrinkage of Concrete Masonry Units and 
Swelling of Brick Masonry 
Learning Point. Even in the absence of applied loading, 
changes in moisture and temperature in materials will cause 
strain. If the strain is resisted, stresses occur. The stresses can 
cause failure of building elements. 
Narrative. Concrete frames and concrete masonry units 
shrink with time. Clay bricks, on the other hand, expand with 
time. Two buildings in Alberta, Canada, constructed of con-
crete masonry units (CMUs) showed patterns of shrinkage-
induced cracks about 2 m apart (Mattar and Morstead 1987). 
Buildings with brick cladding, in contrast, often experience 
compressive stress buildup from restrained expansion (Beasley 
1987). 
Technical Aspects and Calculations. According to Drys-
dale et al. (1994), clay bricks have thermal coefficients of ex-
pansion of 4.5-7.2 X 10-6 mm/mm;oC and moisture expan-
sion of 0.016-0.028% at approximately 500 d (for Canadian 
bricks). For CMU the thermal coefficient was 7.2-9.0 X 10-6 
mm/mm/oC, and shrinkage was 0.01-0.06% (ultimate shrink-
age values). The modulus of elasticity (£) for masonry is cor-
related with strength; the modulus for clay bricks with a com-
pressive strength of 35 MPa may be 10-28 GPa, and the 
modulus for CMU with a 17-MPa compressive strength may 
be from 7.6 to 10 GPa. 
If we take typical values for a 30-m brick wall, 500 dafter 
construction, we can calculate a strain due to moisture expan-
sion (0.02%) and a 28°C temperature rise (thermal coefficient 
6.3 X 10-6 mm/mm/°C) of 0.0375%. Multiplying this by a 
modulus of elasticity of 20.7 GPa, the compressive stress is 
7.75 MPa if the expansion is restrained. This is not enough to 
fail a single unit but may be enough to buckle a wall. If the 
wall is allowed to move, it will move 11.4 mm. Therefore, the 
designer must provide a gap of at least this much if stress 
buildup is to be prevented. 
For CMU with 0.04% shrinkage and a 28°C temperature 
drop (thermal coefficient 8.1 X 10-6 mm/mm/°C), the strain 
would be 0.0625%. If the wall is restrained, the tensile stress 
(for E = 13.8 OPa) would be 8.6-MPa tension, which is en-
ough to crack the block. To prevent cracking, control joints 
are required. 
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FIG. 9. Masonry Detail Allowing Movement (Drysdale et al. 
1994): (a) Requirement for Thicker Mortar Joints; (b) Use of 
Notched Brick to Maintain Standard Mortar Joint Thickness (Re-
printed by Permission) 
Problems are exacerbated when brick facades are tied to 
concrete or CMU structures without proper detailing to allow 
for movement. A typical detail allowing expansion of a brick 
facade and preventing stress buildup is shown in Fig. 9. 
Ethical Considerations. Who is responsible for structural 
problems caused by poor detailing of masonry? Note that these 
problems often show up years after the facility is put into 
service. Many engineers are not aware of the existence or mag-
nitude of these movements, which may be dangerous if ig-
nored. 
Structural Deformation as Warning of Impending Col/apse: 
Hartford Civic Center Arena 
Learning Point. Higher than expected deformations may 
indicate that the structure is overloaded. 
Narrative. At approximately 4: 15 a.m. on January 17, 
1978, the roof of the Hartford Civic Center Arena collapsed. 
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FIG. 11. Truss Member Forces (Kaminetzky 1991) (Reprinted 
by Permission) 
FIG. 12. Buckled Compression Diagonal (Kaminetzky 1991) 
(Reprinted by Permission) 
Only six hours earlier, 5,000 people had been in the arena 
watching a basketball game. The arena roof was a 90- by 
11O-m space frame (Levy and Salvadori 1992; Kaminetzsky 
1991; Feld and Carper 1997). 
Technical Aspects and Calculations. During construc-
tion in 1972 and 1973, the inspection agency notified the en-
gineers of excessive deflections (Levy and Salvadori 1992). 
The measured deflection of the root was twice that predicted 
by computer analysis. On the day of the collapse, the sum of 
dead and live loads was less than the design load. Plan and 
elevation views of the roof truss are shown in Fig. 10. 
The large deformations were a warning that the structure 
was not behaving as the computer model had predicted and 
was on the verge of collapse (Levy and Salvadori 1992). Ka-
minetzky (1991) suggests that the deformations were "cries 
for help" from the structure. 
This case study can be introduced early in a mechanics of 
materials course when member deformations are first taught, 
and then discussed again when elastic buckling is encountered. 
Numerous factors contributed to the collapse, among them that 
the main top chords had a much lower buckling capacity than 
assumed in the original design analysis. The unbraced length 
of some compression members was 9.14 m rather than the 
assumed 4.57 m; thus, the capacity was reduced 75% by this 
factor alone. Other factors reduced member capacity even fur-
ther (Feld and Carper 1997), and this case study could be 
revisited several times to bring out specific points about three-
dimensional structural behavior and the dangers of over-reli-
ance on two-dimensional models. 
Ethical Considerations. What measures should be taken 
when observed structural deformations greatly exceed pre-
dicted deformations? Should a structure that will kill 5,000 
people if it collapses be designed with greater care and a 
higher factor of safety (Kaminetzky 1991)? 
Elastic Buckling: Stepped Roof Structure, Elwood, Long 
Island, N. Y. 
Learning Point. Elastic buckling may occur with little 
warning. Stepped roofs may have substantially higher local 
snow loads than flat roofs. 
Narrative. After a heavy snowstorm, a stepped roof col-
lapsed. The 1.7-m differential level between parts of the roof 
allowed for the buildup of drifting snow. A compression di-
agonal on a roof truss buckled (Kaminetzky 1991). 
Technical Aspects and Calculations. The truss is shown 
in Fig. 11, along with calculated member forces. The buckled 
compression diagonal is shown in Fig. 12. The elastic buckling 
capacity of the 25.4-mm diameter steep pipe (unbraced length 
0.705 m, E = 200 GPa) can be calculated as 55.6 kN for 3.175-
mm thick pipes or 76.2 kN for 6.35-mm thick pipe. The force 
in the truss member at the time of the collapse was 61.0 kN. 
Even a solid steel pipe of this diameter would only have an 
elastic buckling capacity of 81.3 kN, which would leave a very 
small factor of safety under the applied load. 
Ethical Considerations. Some types of loads, such as 
drifting snow live load, require more thought from the engi-
neer than simply copying them out of the building code. Oc-
casionally, code loadings are applied incorrectly. 
SOURCES 
Kaminetzky (1991), Levy and Salvadori (1992), Shepherd 
and Frost (1995), and Feld and Carper (1997) provide a large 
number and variety of case studies. Many others can be found 
in the ASCE Journal of the Performance of Constructed Fa­
cilities or ENR. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated that many topics in fundamen-
tal engineering mechanics courses can be introduced or em-
phasized using failure case studies. An additional benefit is 
that these case studies provide opportunities to discuss the val-
ues and ethics of the engineering profession. Perhaps most 
importantly, they provide a way to inspire and spark the in-
terest of engineering students. 
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